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This paper investigates the relationship between geographic patterns of in-
dustrial activity and endogenous growth in a two region model of trade that
exhibits no scale eﬀect. The in-house process innovation of manufacturing ﬁrms
drives productivity growth and is closely associated with ﬁrm-level scales of
production and relative levels of accessible technical knowledge. Focusing on
long-run industry shares and a cross-region productivity gap, we ﬁnd that dis-
persed equilibria with positive industry shares for both regions always produce
higher growth rates than core-periphery equilibria with all industry locating
in one region. Moreover, the highest growth rate arises in a symmetric steady
state that features no productivity gap and equal shares of industry leading
to the conclusion that the geographic concentration of industry has a negative
impact on overall growth. Convergence towards a dispersed equilibrium, how-
ever, is contingent on the levels of inter-regional transport costs and knowledge
dispersion. Finally, we explore the implications of greater economic integra-
tion arising from reduced transport costs and greater knowledge dispersion for
patterns of industry and productivity, and for regional welfare levels within a
dispersed equilibrium.
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Even the most casual observer of economic geography will recognize that the distri-
bution of industrial activity is uneven at local, regional, and international levels. A
distinctly more subtle issue, however, relates to unravelling the relationship between
these patterns of industrial concentration and economic growth. Although a broadly
historical perspective generally leads to the prediction that a higher concentration of
industry supports a greater rate of economic growth (Baldwin et al. 2001), the re-
sults obtained by recent empirical studies are mixed. For example, Braunerhjelm and
Borgman (2004) report a positive relationship between industry concentration and la-
bor productivity growth in Sweden, while Br¨ ulhart and Sbergami (2009) investigate
cross-country data that suggests the relationship between industry concentration and
GDP growth depends on a country’s level of economic development. Bosker (2007),
on the other hand, ﬁnds that on average European regions with a denser spread of
employment tend to experience slower rates of growth in GDP. In addition, Gardiner
et al. (2010) report a negative relationship between a number of measures of industry
concentration and GDP growth for several levels of agglomeration using European
regional data. These mixed results are diﬃcult to interpret as the existing theoretical
models of the “new economic geography” literature predict a positive relationship
between agglomeration and growth (Baldwin and Martin, 2004).
In this paper, we introduce a novel theoretical approach that supports a negative
relationship between the geographic concentration of industry and aggregate economic
growth. Building upon the in-house process innovation literature established by Smul-
ders and van de Klundert (1995) and Peretto (1996), we develop a two region model of
trade in which the distribution of manufacturing activity and productivity growth are
determined endogenously by the innovation activities of monopolistically competitive
manufacturing ﬁrms, and then explore the mechanisms through which growth eﬀects
the geography of industry and in turn the implications of this geography for growth.
1Our model produces two types of long-run equilibrium: a core-periphery equilibrium
in which all industry, and hence all productivity growth, occurs in one region, and a
dispersed equilibrium in which industrial activity and productivity growth is spread
across regions. Investigating the dynamics around a dispersed equilibrium, we ﬁnd
that the long-run pattern of industry is determined by the balance between a desta-
bilizing competition eﬀect and stabilizing productivity eﬀect, the relative strengths of
which depend on the level of transport costs and the degree of knowledge dispersion
between regions. In particular, convergence in industry shares, the level of produc-
tivity, and the rate of productivity growth to a dispersed equilibrium is contingent
on the levels of transport costs and knowledge dispersion between regions. Ascer-
taining which pattern of industrial activity the economy converges to in the long run
is important as an equal dispersion of industry across regions is found to yield the
highest rate of productivity growth but the lowest level of product variety. As such
our framework lends support to empirical studies such as Bosker (2007) and Gardiner
et al. (2010) that ﬁnd a negative correspondence between the density of economic
activity and the rate of economic growth.
Our paper is closely related with studies in the “new economic geography” litera-
ture that emphasize key elements of the variety-expansion model of innovation-based
endogenous growth (Grossman and Helpman, 1991). These studies tend to ﬁnd that
agglomeration economies and growth are reinforcing processes, that is, a higher con-
centration of industry tends to promote economic growth (Baldwin and Martin, 2004).
A key feature of the models adopted in this literature, however, is a scale eﬀect in
which the rate of growth is positively correlated with the labor endowment of the
economy. Indeed, the scale eﬀect appears to play a central role in the relationship
between industry concentration and the endogenous pace of growth. The existence
of the scale eﬀect, however, has generally been rejected by empirical studies (Lainez
and Peretto, 2006) indicating the need for a reassessment of this relationship in a
2framework that corrects for the scale eﬀect. To this end, Minniti and Parello (2011)
introduce population growth and decreasing returns in research and development
(R&D) following Jones (1995) and investigate the relationship between trade integra-
tion and scale-invariant economic growth.1 Interestingly, under this modiﬁcation of
the variety-expansion model, long-run growth is proportionate to population growth
and determined independently of the level of industry concentration. In contrast, the
in-house process innovation framework that we adopt in this paper shifts the focus
from R&D activity at the aggregate level towards innovation at the level of individual
product lines thereby removing the eﬀects of population size on ﬁrm-level incentives
for R&D and allowing for the endogenous determination of both the spatial distri-
bution of industry and the long-run rate of productivity growth without the bias
generated by scale eﬀects.
A convenient feature of our framework is that the long-run equilibrium can be
characterized completely in terms of the shares of manufacturing activity locating in
each region and a productivity diﬀerential between regions. Examining stable dis-
persed equilibria, we ﬁnd that the larger region always has a greater share of industry
and a higher relative productivity, and thus that the model is consistent with the well
established empirical result that ﬁrms are more productive in regions with a greater
density of economic activity (Melo et al. 2009). We also investigate the impacts of
greater economic integration between regions resulting from lower transport costs and
greater knowledge dissemination. First, a decrease in the level of inter-regional trans-
port costs increases both the share of industry and the relative productivity of the
larger, more advanced region indicating that it attains a higher rate of productivity
growth over the short-run transition. The increased concentration of industry in the
larger region has a negative impact, however, on the overall long-run rate of productiv-
1See Futagami and Iwaisako (2007) for more detail on variety expansion models of scale-invariant
endogenous growth. In addition, Segerstrom (1998) and Li (2003) develop rising product quality
models of scale-invariant endogenous growth.
3ity growth. On the other hand, an increase in the degree of inter-regional knowledge
dissemination raises both the share of industry and the relative productivity of the
smaller region providing credence to agglomeration theories based on localized knowl-
edge spillovers. Although the relative pace of productivity growth rises for the less
advanced region in the short run, the impact on overall long-run productivity growth
is ambiguous owing to the fact that greater knowledge dissemination simultaneously
raises the productivity of labor in innovation and lowers ﬁrm-level employment in
innovation as an increase in the total number of incumbent ﬁrms crowds out R&D
investment.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we present our basic
model of endogenous productivity growth. Section 3 then examines the character-
istics of core-periphery equilibria with the manufacturing industry concentrated in
one region. The features of dispersed equilibria are then investigated in Section 4.
We investigate the eﬀects of several key variables on patterns of industry trade and
location, and the rate of productivity growth in Section 5. Implications for regional
welfare are then discussed in Section 6. Finally, we provide concluding remarks in
Section 7. All calculations are provided in the Appendix.
2 The Model
Consider a two region general equilibrium model of trade and endogenous growth with
two sectors: traditional production (Y ) and manufacturing (X). The traditional sec-
tor is a standard constant returns to scale industry that is characterized by free trade
and allows for a common wage rate in both regions. Firms in the manufacturing
sector, on the other hand, compete according to monopolistic competition and incur
iceberg transport costs on inter-regional transactions. Economic growth is driven by
the in-house process innovation of manufacturing ﬁrms which leads to improvements
in production technology. Labor (L), the sole factor of production, is supplied in-
4elastically by households and, although there is no inter-regional migration, moves
freely between the traditional and manufacturing sectors in each region. We refer to
the two regions as the North and the South, and use an asterisk to indicate variables
associated with the Southern region. In the following description of the model we
focus on the North but analogous conditions can be obtained for the South.
2.1 Households
The demand side of the model is composed of dynastic households that optimize
utility over an inﬁnite time horizon by selecting optimal allocations of income ﬂows
across saving and expenditure. The aggregated preferences of households residing in





−ρt [αlnCX(t) + (1 − α)lnCY(t)]dt, (1)
where CX(t) and CY(t) are the respective consumptions at time t of a manufacturing
composite and the traditional good, α ∈ (0,1) is the expenditure share for manufac-
turing goods, and ρ is the subjective discount rate. The manufacturing composite
















where ci is the demand for variety i of the mass n varieties produced in the North, cj
is the demand for variety j of the mass n∗ varieties produced in the South, and σ > 1
is the elasticity of substitution across varieties.
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5where E(t) is aggregate household expenditure, w(t) is the wage rate, L is the labor
force, r(t) is the nominal interest rate, and B(0) is initial asset holdings in the North-
ern region.2 Intertemporal utility maximization yields the standard Ramsey saving
rule described by the following Euler condition:
˙ E(t)
E(t)
= r(t) − ρ, (3)
where a dot over a variable indicates diﬀerentiation with respect to time. We assume
perfect capital mobility between regions and it follows that the North and the South
share a common nominal interest rate and motions for household expenditure: ˙ E/E =
˙ E∗/E∗ = r − ρ. Time notation is suppressed for the remainder of the paper unless
required.
A constant share of household expenditure is allocated to the traditional good and
the manufacturing composite each period:
PXCX = αE, PY CY = (1 − α)E, (4)
where PX is the price index corresponding to the manufacturing composite and PY is














where pi is the price of variety i produced in the North, p∗
j is the price of variety j
produced in the South, and τ > 1 is an iceberg transport cost, under which τ units
must be shipped for every unit sold in the export market (Samuelson, 1951).
Regarding the price index (5) as the household’s unit expenditure function for
manufacturing goods, the total Northern demands for representative varieties i and
2The value of asset holdings (B) will be driven to zero by free entry in the manufacturing sector.
See Section 2.5 for more details.
6j respectively produced in the North and the South can be obtained by using Sher-












The traditional sector produces a homogeneous good for a perfectly competitive inter-
regional market that is characterized by free trade. Firms in both regions produce
goods using a similar constant returns to scale technology whereby one unit of output
requires the employment of one unit labor. Under this production technology the
price of the traditional good equals the wage rate and, with free trade and incomplete
specialization of traditional production, the wage rate is common across regions.3 We
set the traditional good as the model numeraire and the traditional good price and
the wage rate both equal one, PY = P ∗
Y = w = 1, at all times.
2.3 Manufacturing
The manufacturing sector features ﬁrms that produce horizontally diﬀerentiated prod-
ucts and complete according to monopolistic competition (Dixit and Stiglitz, 1977).
At any moment in time, there are n ﬁrms in the North and n∗ ﬁrms in the South,
each producing a unique variety and investing in process innovation with the ob-
jective of reducing future costs of production. Firms enter the market freely with
negligible costs of product development and, with active process innovation, begin
their operations with the same level of productivity as extant ﬁrms based in the same
region. Once a ﬁrm has entered the market it incurs a per-period ﬁxed labor cost
(lF) that corresponds with product marketing and the management of production
and innovation activities.
3In particular, we assume that the traditional share of household expenditure (1−α) is suﬃciently
large to ensure that there is always an active traditional sector in each region.
7Manufacturing ﬁrms employ a constant returns to scale production technology
that is symmetric within a region but may diﬀer across regions. Speciﬁcally, the
production function for a representative ﬁrm based in the North is
x = θlX, (7)
where θ > 0 is a ﬁrm-speciﬁc productivity coeﬃcient, and lX is ﬁrm-level employment
in production. As indicated above, all ﬁrms based in the same region have the same
level of productivity, but we allow for productivity diﬀerences across regions (θ  = θ∗).
A ﬁrm faces demand for its product from both the domestic and the export mar-
kets. With iceberg transport costs, however, ﬁrms must produce additional units for
sales to the export market in order to cover units lost in transit. Thus, referring
to (6), a Northern ﬁrm produces x = ci + τc∗
i units in order to meet the combined
demands of the Northern and Southern markets. As is well known, under monopolis-
tic competition each ﬁrm maximizes operating proﬁt on sales by setting price equal
to a constant markup over unit cost. The price set by a Northern ﬁrm is therefore
p = σ/(σ − 1)θ. Combining this pricing rule with the demand functions (6) and











where ϕ ≡ τ1−σ is a measure of the freeness of trade with ϕ = 0 indicating pro-
hibitively high transport costs and ϕ = 1 indicating perfectly free trade. With a large
number of ﬁrms, the small market share of any single ﬁrm leads it to ignore the term
in brackets in (8) when evaluating the impact of changes in price on operating proﬁt
on sales.
82.4 Process Innovation
Manufacturing ﬁrms invest in in-house process innovation with the objective of max-
imizing ﬁrm value. Improvements in technology reduce production costs and lead to
lower prices allowing ﬁrms to increase their market shares and raise proﬁts on sales.
Returning to the production function (7), we consider process innovations that
generate improvements in productivity through increases in θ. In particular, the
productivity of a representative Northern ﬁrm evolves according to
˙ θ = KlR, (9)
where K is labor productivity in in-house process innovation, and lR is ﬁrm-level
R&D employment.
Following the in-house process innovation literature (Smulders and van de Klun-
dert, 1995; Peretto, 1996), we model the productivity of labor in in-house innovation
as a function of the weighted average productivity of technologies observable by the
ﬁrm:
K = sθ + δs
∗θ
∗, (10)
where s ≡ n/N and s∗ ≡ n∗/N are respectively the shares of industry located in the
North and the South, and N ≡ n + n∗ is the total number of ﬁrms. The exogenous
parameter δ ∈ (0,1) regulates the inter-regional scope of knowledge dissemination
between ﬁrms.4
Implicit in the speciﬁcation of (10) is the assumption that a ﬁrm’s production tech-
nology is a culmination of the accumulation of both codiﬁable and tacit knowledge
4In order to focus on the implications of cross-region knowledge spillovers for industry location
and growth within a simple framework, we have assumed that the number of ﬁrms is large enough to
ensure that the inﬂuence of a single ﬁrm’s technology on labor productivity in in-house innovation
is negligible.
9(Keller, 2004). While codiﬁable knowledge is easily conveyed across large distances us-
ing modern communication technology, the transfer of tacit knowledge tends to require
face-to-face communication. Indeed, the imperfect nature of knowledge spillovers is
well documented in empirical studies such as Jaﬀe et al. (1993), Mancusi (2008), and
Coe et al. (2009). Accordingly, we interpret the parameter δ as describing the level of
knowledge that can be transferred over large distances given the current state of com-
munication technology. For example, when δ = 0 knowledge spillovers are completely
local in scope, and when δ = 1 there is perfect inter-regional knowledge dispersion.5
A ﬁrm’s intertemporal optimization problem entails choosing the level of invest-
ment in process innovation that maximizes the future ﬂow of proﬁts. The total
per-period proﬁt of a Northern ﬁrm equals operating proﬁt on sales minus the cost
of investment in process innovation and the per-period ﬁxed labor cost lF:
Π = π − lR − lF. (11)





subject to the technological constraint (9). This optimization problem can be solved
using the following current value Hamiltonian function: H = Π + µKlR, where µ is
the current shadow value of an improvement in the technology of a Northern ﬁrm.
The optimal investment path for process innovation satisﬁes conditions for both
static and dynamic eﬃciency in addition to a standard transversality condition.6
Static eﬃciency requires that a marginal increase in the value of technology equal the
marginal cost of process innovation, that is, µ = 1/K. Dynamic eﬃciency requires
that the return to investment in process innovation equal the rate of return on a
risk free asset, that is, µr − ˙ µ = ∂π/∂θ, where we assume that the market share of
5Baldwin and Forslid (2000) introduce a similar speciﬁcation for the level of inter-regional knowl-
edge spillovers in a variety expansion model of innovation-based endogenous growth.
6In the next subsection we show that r = ρ at all moments in time. As a result, the transversality
condition is limt→∞ e−ρtµθ = 0.
10each ﬁrm is small enough that it disregards the impact of its innovation eﬀorts on
both the composite price index (PX) and knowledge spillovers to rival ﬁrms (K).7









This no-arbitrage condition must bind whenever there is active process innovation.
2.5 Free Entry
Manufacturing ﬁrms are free to enter and exit the market. As a result, the number
of ﬁrms based in each region adjusts until per-period proﬁts (11) are driven to zero.
With ﬁrms earning zero proﬁts, each region’s expenditure equals its labor income and
is therefore constant given our choice of the traditional good as the model numeraire,
E = L and E∗ = L∗.8 Consequently, from the Euler equation (3), the risk-free interest
rate equals the discount rate and is common across regions at all moments in time,
r = ρ.
The relative state of technology arising between ﬁrms based in the North and the




which we refer to as the productivity gap. Given the pricing rules set by manufacturing
ﬁrms, the productivity gap also describes the relative price of Southern produced
varieties, that is ω = p∗/p.
7The risk-free asset is simply used as a link between the internal rate of return to in-house
innovation and the external rate of return to investment in the market for investment funds.
8More speciﬁcally, household wealth equals zero in equilibrium, B = 0, as ﬁrm value is driven to
zero by free entry, V = 0.
11The zero proﬁt conditions can be conveniently expressed in terms of ﬁrm-level
employment. First, using the demand functions (6) and the production function
(7) with the pricing rules yields the optimal levels of employment in production for























Then, setting per-period proﬁts (11) equal to zero and using (14) and (15) with (8),
the free market entry conditions can be written as
lX = (σ − 1)(lR + lF), l
∗
X = (σ − 1)(l
∗
R + lF), (16)
for the North and the South, respectively.
3 Core-periphery Long-run Equilibrium
In this section we investigate the characteristics of the core-periphery long-run equi-
librium for which the manufacturing industry concentrates completely in one region.
In particular, we are interested in state-state equilibria that feature a constant in-
tersectoral allocation of labor in each region. To simplify the exposition we focus on
the case where all manufacturing and innovation activity occurs in the North. In this
case, although the North continues to produce traditional goods, the South special-
izes completely in traditional production and imports manufacturing goods from the
North in return for the traditional good.
To begin with, consider a situation in which the no-arbitrage condition (12) binds
in the North but not in the South. With no Southern employment in process innova-
tion, the technology gap ω increases indeﬁnitely with the North becoming increasingly
12advanced and the South becoming increasingly backward. At ﬁrst Southern ﬁrms will
earn positive per-period proﬁts (Π∗ > 0) as they no longer incur the ﬁxed cost l∗
R.
Without process innovation, however, there will be no new market entry in the South,
and consequently, the number of Northern ﬁrms will rise to absorb these additional
proﬁts thereby driving Southern proﬁts to zero, l∗
X = (σ − 1)lF. It then follows that
as Southern employment in production is a decreasing function of ω from (15), the
rising technology gap steadily reduces the Southern share of manufacturing ﬁrms that
can be supported by the zero proﬁt condition. As a result, the Northern share of the
manufacturing industry converges to one (s = 1).
With all manufacturing and innovation activity occurring in the North, the zero-
proﬁt condition (16) can be used with (9) and (10) to rewrite the binding no-arbitrage
condition (12) for Northern ﬁrms as ρ = (σ − 2)lX/(σ − 1) + lF. In addition, setting
l∗
X = 0, and using n∗ = 0 with the pricing rules for manufacturing ﬁrms in (14) yields
the product market clearing condition nlX = α(σ − 1)(L + L∗)/σ. Combining these
two conditions, we ﬁnd that the equilibrium number of ﬁrms is
NC =
α(σ − 2)(L + L∗)
σ(ρ − lF)
, (17)
where the subscript C denotes a concentrated equilibrium, and NC = n as all manu-
facturing ﬁrms are located in the North. Not surprisingly, an increase in the overall
market size (L + L∗) increases the number of ﬁrms (NC). On the other hand, an
increase in lF, or similarly, a decrease in ρ, lowers the level of employment in produc-
tion (lX) that satisﬁes the no-arbitrage condition and thus raises the number of ﬁrms
through the product market clearing condition. These results parallel those obtained
by Smulders and van de Klundert (1995) for a closed economy. Finally, a positive
level of market entry requires that the return to process innovation (ρ) cover the
per-period ﬁxed costs (lF). To ensure both positive market entry and productivity
13growth, we assume that ρ > (σ − 1)lF for the remainder of the paper.9
The long-run rate of productivity growth associated with the core-periphery equi-
librium can now be obtained using (8), (9), and (10) with (12) and (17):
gC =
α(σ − 1)(L + L∗)
σNC
− ρ =
ρ − (σ − 1)lF
σ − 2
. (18)
From (18) we can see that there is no scale eﬀect in the model as an increase in
market size (L + L∗) is neutralized by an increase in the number of manufacturing
ﬁrms (NC).10
Changes in the ﬁxed cost and the discount rate have opposing eﬀects on the rate
of productivity growth. An increase in the ﬁxed cost (lF) has a negative eﬀect on
productivity growth as it raises the number of ﬁrms leading to a greater allocation
of labor to per-period ﬁxed cost that crowds out employment in process innovation.
In contrast, although an increase in the discount rate (ρ) has both a direct negative
eﬀect and an indirect positive eﬀect, through NC, on the rate of productivity growth,
the indirect eﬀect dominates the direct eﬀect and as a result gC is positively related
to ρ. These results are similar to those found by Smulders and van de Klundert
(1995) and, in a diﬀerent context, Dinopoulos and Thompson (1998), and highlight
the tension between market concentration and productivity growth that arises in this
type of endogenous growth model.
9Positive levels of market entry and innovation activity also require σ > 2. This requirement for
the elasticity of substitution is supported by the average and median estimates obtained by Broda
and Weinstein (2006) for various levels of industry disaggregation.
10The core-periphery rate of productivity growth is determined independently of the degree of
inter-regional knowledge spillovers (δ) and the freeness of trade (ϕ). This is a common characteristic
of models which assume that innovation and production are tied to the same location, as shown by
a comparison of, for example, Martin and Ottaviano (1999) and Baldwin et al. (2001).
144 Dispersed Long-run Equilibrium
This section provides a characterization of the dispersed long-run equilibrium that
occurs when both regions have active manufacturing sectors and positive productivity
growth. Once again we are interested in steady states that feature constant labor
allocations in both regions. For the dispersed long-run equilibrium, this requires a
constant productivity gap and constant numbers of ﬁrms based in each region.
In order to describe the evolution of the productivity gap we take the time deriva-














where we have used (9). Clearly the evolution of the productivity gap depends on the
relative levels of knowledge available to ﬁrms based in each region and their respective







and a constant productivity gap therefore naturally implies equal rates of productivity
growth in the North and the South.
With active process innovation in both regions the investment and entry decisions
of manufacturing ﬁrms are determined by the no-arbitrage conditions of both regions
(12), and the free entry conditions (16). In Appendix A we show that the dispersed
equilibrium described by these investment and entry conditions can be reduced to a
system of two equations that fully describe the long-run equilibrium in terms of the
productivity gap (ω) and the North’s share of industry (s ≡ n/N).
The ﬁrst condition requires that the average level of accessible knowledge relative
to ﬁrm level productivity be the same for both regions, that is, K/θ = K∗/θ∗. Sub-












stituting (10) and (13) into this condition and rearranging, we solve for the North’s
share of industry as
sK =
1 − δω−1
2 − δω − δω−1. (21)
As illustrated by the sK curve in Figure 1, this condition is strictly increasing in ω as
an increase in the industry share of Northern ﬁrms is necessary to oﬀset the beneﬁt
that Southern ﬁrms derive from the increase in relative access to knowledge when
the productivity gap rises. This tension between the industry share of the advanced
region and the access of the backward region to relatively advanced knowledge is
regulated by the degree of inter-regional knowledge dispersion (δ). Indeed, a close
inspection of (21) indicates that ω ∈ (δ,1/δ) is required for sK ∈ (0,1) with equal
access to knowledge in both regions.
The second condition requires that ﬁrm-level scales of production equalize across
regions, lX = l∗
X. Substituting (14) and (15) into this condition, we once again solve









L + L∗. (22)
16As shown by the sR curve depicted in Figure 1 for the symmetric case where L = L∗,
this condition is also strictly increasing in ω. The relationship between the produc-
tivity gap and industry share described by the sR curve is determined by the link
between ﬁrm-level scales of production and innovation that arises with free entry
(16). An increase in ω raises the market shares, and therefore the proﬁts, of Northern
ﬁrms precipitating an increase in the North’s share of industry. The size of this eﬀect
is determined by the freeness of trade with a rise in ϕ increasing the slope of the sR
curve.
Convergence to or divergence away from the dispersed long-run equilibrium illus-
trated in Figure 1 depends crucially on the level of transport costs and the degree of
inter-regional knowledge spillovers. In Appendix A we approximate the local dynam-
ics around the symmetric equilibrium using a Taylor expansion of (19) evaluated at
ω = 1 and s = 1/2, and obtain the following proposition:
Proposition 1 (Convergence in the productivity gap): The symmetric dispersed equi-
librium is saddle-path stable for ϕ < ˜ ϕ, where
˜ ϕ = (κ − 1) −
p
(κ − 2)κ, κ =
(σ − 1)(1 + δ)(2ρ − (1 + δ)lF)
δ(2ρ − (σ − 1)(1 + δ)lF)
.
Proof: See Appendix A. ￿
The threshold ˜ ϕ determines the level of transport costs above which ﬁrm-level
rates of productivity growth converge and is closely related to the degree of inter-
regional knowledge spillovers as summarized in the following corollary:
Corollary 1 The threshold ˜ ϕ is increasing in the degree of inter-regional knowledge
spillovers (δ) for δ < ˜ δ and decreasing for δ > ˜ δ, where
˜ δ =
(σ − 1)(2ρ − lF)
(σ − 1)(2ρ − lF) − 4ρ
.
17Proof: See Appendix B. ￿
A change in the productivity gap aﬀects ﬁrm-level productivity growth in the
North and the South both directly and indirectly through adjustments in the number
of ﬁrms based in each region. In the symmetric equilibrium, however, the indirect
eﬀects cancel out leaving two opposing direct eﬀects that combine to determine the
stability of long-run equilibrium. These direct eﬀects can be identiﬁed by substituting
(16) into (20), taking the partial derivative with respect to ω, and evaluating the result

















(1 + ϕ)2 − δlR. (23)
A negative sign for this partial derivative implies a stable dispersed equilibrium.
Starting from the symmetric equilibrium, consider the eﬀects of an exogenous
perturbation that increases the productivity gap. The ﬁrst term on the right-hand
side of (23) describes the destabilizing competition eﬀect associated with the ensuing
increase in the production scale of Northern ﬁrms relative to Southern ﬁrms. As
ﬁrm-level employment in innovation is determined proportionately with the scale of
production through the free entry condition (16), the rate of productivity growth rises
in the North and falls in the South causing subsequent increases in the productivity
gap. The strength of this destabilizing force is increasing in both the freeness of
trade (ϕ) and the degree of inter-regional knowledge spillovers (δ). In contrast, the
second term on the right-hand side of (23) describes the stabilizing productivity eﬀect
corresponding with the rise of Southern labor productivity in innovation (K∗) relative
to the North (K). The rate of productivity growth falls in the North and rises in the
South causing the productivity gap to fall back to the symmetric equilibrium. The
strength of this stabilizing force depends on the degree of inter-regional knowledge
spillovers (δ). The stability of the symmetric dispersed equilibrium is determined by
18the balance of these opposing forces with convergence in technologies more likely for
lower levels of ϕ and intermediates levels of δ.
To complete this section we investigate the relationship between the productivity
gap and the total number of ﬁrms and the consequences of this relationship for long-
run productivity growth in a more general setting. To facilitate this investigation we








2 − δω − δω−1. (24)
The relative level of accessible knowledge is convex in the productivity gap with a
minimum at ω = 1, and therefore plays a key role in the determination of the total
number of ﬁrms and the rate of productivity growth through its impact on the cost
of innovation.
Next, combining (14) and (15), the total number of ﬁrms can be obtained as a
function of the scale of production: ND = α(σ − 1)(L + L∗)/σlX. Then, using (16),
the steady-state no-arbitrage condition ρ = [K/θ][(σ −2)lX/(σ −1) + lF] shows that
there is a negative relationship between the scale of production and the relative level
of accessible knowledge. Using these conditions together with (24) yields the following
expression for the long-run number of ﬁrms:
ND =
α(σ − 2)(1 − δ2)(L + L∗)
σ [(2 − δω − δω−1)ρ − (1 − δ2)lF]
, (25)
where the subscript D indicates a dispersed equilibrium.11 The relationship between
the total number of ﬁrms and the productivity gap is also U-shaped with a minimum
at ω = 1, as illustrated by the ND(ω) curve in Figure 2a. In particular, for ω < 1, an
11In Proposition 2 we will show that K/θ < 1 in a dispersed equilibrium. As such, our earlier
assumption ρ > (σ − 1)lF is suﬃcient to ensure positive market entry and productivity growth in
both core-periphery and dispersed equilibria.












(b) Rate of Productivity Growth
increase in ω lowers K/θ and raises the ﬁxed cost of innovation leading to a decrease
in the number of ﬁrms that the market can support under free entry. For ω > 1, on
the other hand, a rise in ω increases K/θ and the number of ﬁrms increases. Thus,
the non-monotonic relationship between ω and ND arises from the links between
ﬁrm scale, the relative level of accessible knowledge, and the productivity gap. In
addition, we can show that the total number of ﬁrms is always smaller in the dispersed
equilibrium than in the core-periphery equilibrium, as seen in Figure 2a.
Finally, combining (9), (16), (24) and (25), the dispersed rate of productivity
growth can be derived as a function of the productivity gap alone:
gD =
α(σ − 1)(1 − δ2)(L + L∗)





(σ − 1)(1 − δ2)lF
(σ − 2)(2 − δω − δω−1)
. (26)
As in the core-periphery equilibrium, the long-run rate of productivity growth is
positively related to the discount rate (ρ) and negatively related to the per-period
ﬁxed cost (lF). The ﬁrst and second order derivatives of (26) with respect to ω provide
the following lemma:
Lemma 1 (Long-run productivity growth and the productivity gap): The long-run
20rate of productivity growth is concave in ω with a maximum at ω = 1.
Proof: Simple partial diﬀerentiation of (26). ￿
This result is a variant of the rationalization eﬀect (Peretto, 2003) recast in terms
of the productivity gap. The non-monotonic relationship between long-run produc-
tivity growth and the productivity gap stems from the U-shaped relationship between
the relative level of accessible knowledge and the productivity gap shown in (24). For
example, if ω < 1, a rise in ω lowers K/θ. The consequent fall in the total number
of ﬁrms (ND) raises scales of employment in both production and innovation thereby
increasing the productivity growth rate. In contrast, for ω > 1, an increase in ω raises
K/θ and ND rises. The increase in the total number of ﬁrms lowers employment in
innovation and the rate of productivity growth falls.
A comparison of the core-periphery rate of productivity growth (gC) with that of
the dispersed equilibrium (gD) leads to the following proposition:
Proposition 2 (Productivity growth comparison): Productivity growth is always higher
in the dispersed equilibrium than in the core-periphery equilibrium.
Proof: Subtracting (18) from (26) gives










This diﬀerence is positive for K/θ < 1, which is always the case if the dispersed
equilibrium exists as ω ∈ (δ,1/δ) is required for sK ∈ (0,1), as shown in Figure 1. ￿
With imperfect inter-regional knowledge dissemination (0 < δ < 1), the relative
level of accessible knowledge is always higher in the core-periphery equilibrium than
it is in the dispersed equilibrium. Although we might expect this to lead to a greater
rate of productivity growth for the core-periphery equilibrium, the rationalization
eﬀect lowers the ﬁrm-level scale of innovation activity below that for the dispersed
equilibrium (lRC < lRD), and thus the dispersed rate of productivity growth dominates
21the core-periphery rate of productivity growth whenever the dispersed equilibrium
exists, that is, for ω ∈ (δ,1/δ).
5 Patterns of Industry, Productivity, and Growth
In this section we examine the implications of changes in relative market size, the level
of transport costs, and the degree of inter-regional knowledge spillovers for patterns of
industry location, the productivity gap, and the long-run rate of productivity growth
that arise in a stable dispersed equilibrium. As we have seen, the relative slopes of
the sK and sR curves are closely related to the freeness of trade and the degree of
inter-regional knowledge spillovers. In Appendix C we compare these relative slopes
with the necessary condition for a stable symmetric dispersed equilibrium given in
Proposition 1 and obtain the following lemma:
Lemma 2 (Relative slopes of the sK and sR curves): In the stable dispersed equilib-
rium the slope of the sK curve is always greater than the slope of the sR curve.
Proof: See Appendix C. ￿
Therefore, in the following discussion we evaluate comparative statics using the slope
ranking required by Lemma 2 and illustrated in Figure 1.
As the sK curve is determined independently of labor endowments, comparative
statics for the eﬀect of a change in relative market size can be derived using the sR
curve alone. The results are summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 3 (Relative market size, industry share, and the productivity gap): In a
dispersed equilibrium, an increase in the relative size of the Northern market (L/L∗)











4(1 − ϕ)L∗ < 0.
22￿
With an increase in the relative market size of the North, the sR curve shifts
upwards leading to a rise in the share of ﬁrms locating in the North and a higher
productivity gap. This result stems from the home market eﬀect of the trade literature
whereby a larger share of ﬁrms locates in the larger market (Krugman, 1980). In our
framework, however, the rise in the North’s share of industry must be oﬀset by an
increase in the productivity gap to ensure equal rates of productivity growth in the
North and the South.
The results of Proposition 3 provide a characterization of the trade patterns that
arise in the dispersed equilibrium. Although both regions continue to produce both
goods, the larger region becomes a net exporter of manufacturing goods and the
smaller region becomes a net exporter of traditional goods. We henceforth adopt the
assumption that the North is the larger region (L > L∗), and therefore that ω > 1
and s > 1/2 when evaluating comparative statics.
The sR curve can also be used to derive comparative statics for the eﬀects of a
change in the freeness of trade (ϕ), as summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 4 (Transport costs, industry share, and the productivity gap): In a
dispersed equilibrium, for L > L∗ a decrease in transport costs (an increase in ϕ)












L + L∗ > 0,
where the term in parentheses is positive for L > L∗ as ω > 1 from Proposition 3. ￿
Referring to Figure 3a, an improvement in the freeness of trade rotates the sR
curve counter-clockwise to s′
R and consequently for L > L∗ the share of industry
based in the North and the productivity gap both rise. A decrease in transport costs


















(b) Eﬀect of an increase in δ
strengthens the home market eﬀect since ﬁrms have a greater incentive to locate
in the larger market as the cost of exporting to the smaller market has fallen. Once
again, however, the increase in the larger region’s share of industry must coincide with
an increase in the productivity gap in order to maintain equal rates of productivity
growth in the North and the South.
The results summarized in Propositions 3 and 4 have interesting consequences for
economic growth. Referring back to Lemma 1 and Figure 2b, any movement in the
productivity gap away from the symmetric equilibrium lowers the rate of productivity
growth. Accordingly, increases in the relative market size of the North (L/L∗) and
the freeness of trade (ϕ) both depress productivity growth.
Next, in order to examine the eﬀect of a change in the degree of inter-regional
knowledge spillovers, we now focus on the sK curve as the sR curve is determined
independently of δ. The results are described in the following proposition:
Proposition 5 (Knowledge spillovers, industry share, and the productivity gap): In a
dispersed equilibrium, for L > L∗, an increase in the degree of inter-regional knowledge
spillovers (δ) decreases both North’s share of industry (s) and the productivity gap (ω).












(1 − δω−1 + 1 − δω)2 > 0,
where ω > 1 for L > L∗ from Proposition 3. ￿
This result is illustrated in Figure 3b. An increase in the degree of inter-regional
knowledge dissemination (δ) rotates the sK curve counter-clockwise to s′
K and the
North’s share of industry and the productivity gap decrease. In particular, the rise in
δ raises Southern labor productivity in innovation relative to that of the North and
industry shares adjust to equate the Northern and the Southern rates of productivity
growth.12
The implications of Proposition 5 for long-run productivity growth are ambiguous.
Referring to Figure 4, we can see that an increase in δ has both a direct and an indirect
eﬀect on gD. The negative direct eﬀect is shown by the downward shift in the gD curve
to g′
D, and results from an increase in the relative level of accessible knowledge that
lowers innovation costs and raises the total number of ﬁrms. The positive indirect
12An increase in δ also reduces the concentration of industry in variety expansion models of
endogenous growth, but through a diﬀerent mechanism. Speciﬁcally, greater knowledge spillovers
raise the rate of innovation thereby eroding monopolistic proﬁts given the faster rate of entry by
new ﬁrms. Lower proﬁt reduces the level of industry concentration (Martin and Ottaviano, 2004).
25eﬀect dω/dδ < 0 is described by a movement along the gD curve towards ω = 1 and
entails a fall in the relative level of accessible knowledge and a subsequent decrease in
the total number of ﬁrms. The balance of these direct and indirect eﬀects determines
whether an increase in the degree of inter-regional knowledge dissemination raises
productivity growth or not (see Table 1 in the next section for numerical examples
showing both cases). The ambiguous relationship between δ and gD contrasts with
the results of the variety expansion literature where an increase in the level of inter-
regional knowledge spillovers always has pro-growth eﬀects (Baldwin and Martin,
2004).
6 Welfare Analysis
In this section we brieﬂy discuss the implications of greater market integration for
region welfare levels in the dispersed long-run equilibrium. In particular, we are
interested in ascertaining whether the North and the South beneﬁt from or are hurt by
increases in the freeness of trade and the degree of inter-regional knowledge dispersion.
Continuing to assume a larger labor endowment for the North (L > L∗), we can use
































where θ(0) and θ(0)∗ are the respective initial productivities of Northern and Southern
ﬁrms, and A = (α(σ − 1)/σ)
α (1 − α)1−α is a constant.
26Table 1: Welfare Eﬀects















1 0.8 0.3 1 0.5 -0.015 0 1.3 2.6 1.3 2.6
1.2 0.8 0.3 1.08 0.66 -0.010 -0.005 -1.5 -0.1 2.4 2.2
1.2 0.85 0.3 1.04 0.62 -0.013 -0.002 -0.1 1.3 2.0 2.6
1.2 0.8 0.35 1.13 0.76 0.009 -0.021 -8.4 -8.5 3.6 0.5
Parameter values are L∗ = 1, α = 0.5, σ = 2.5, lF = 0.01, and ρ = 0.1.
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The ﬁrst term on the right-hand side captures the impact of lower prices on traded
goods and is positive for both regions. The second term describes the terms of trade
eﬀect associated with changes in the relative price of imported manufacturing varieties
and is positive for Northern households and negative for Southern households given
the results summarized in Proposition 4. The third and fourth terms capture the
welfare eﬀects associated with changes in the total number of ﬁrms (ND) and the rate
of productivity growth (gD), respectively, and are the same for both Northern and
Southern households. With the positive relationship between ω and ϕ, however, the
total number of ﬁrms rises and the rate of productivity growth falls, and the overall
welfare eﬀect associated with an increase in the freeness of trade, therefore, depends
on parameter values, as indicated by the numerical examples presented in Table 1.
Turning next to the degree of inter-regional knowledge spillovers, an increase in δ










































27In this case, the ﬁrst term describes the terms of trade eﬀect and is negative for the
North and positive for the South given the result that an increase in δ lowers the
productivity gap from Proposition 5. As before, the remaining terms describe the
changes in total variety (ND) and productivity growth (gD) and are common to both
regions. The overall welfare eﬀects of a change in the degree of inter-regional knowl-
edge spillovers once again depend on parameter values as shown by the numerical
examples presented in Table 1.
7 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have investigated the relationship between productivity growth and
spatial patterns of technology and industrial activity. In particular, we develop a two
region model of trade and endogenous growth without scale eﬀects in which manu-
facturing ﬁrms invest in in-house process innovation with the objective of reducing
production costs. Using this framework we examine core-periphery equilibria for
which all industrial activity occurs in one region and dispersed equilibria for which
industrial activity is dispersed across regions, and ﬁnd that a suﬃciently high level
of transport costs and an intermediate level of inter-regional knowledge dispersion
is required for convergence in technologies to a dispersed long-run equilibrium. De-
termining which type of equilibrium the economy converges to is important as the
highest rate of productivity growth arises in a symmetric equilibrium with no pro-
ductivity gap and equal shares of industry across regions. As such, a key conclusion
of our framework is that geographic concentration of industry has a negative impact
on overall growth.
Considering the eﬀects of greater economic integration, we ﬁnd that within a
dispersed long-run equilibrium although an increase in the freeness of trade leads
to increases in both the larger region’s share of industry and its relative level of
technology, lower transport costs allow for a greater total number of manufacturing
28ﬁrms and as a result investment in innovation falls causing a decrease in the rate of
productivity growth. On the other hand, an increase in the degree of inter-regional
knowledge dispersion decreases the larger region’s share of industry and its relative
level of technology. In this case, the consequences for productivity are ambiguous as
the number of manufacturing ﬁrms may rise or fall. Put together, these results have
interesting implications for the impact of greater economic integration on regional
welfare levels.
The framework presented in this paper is limited in two respects. Firstly, we have
assumed that the production and innovation activities of a ﬁrm must occur in the same
location. An interesting extension might include the separation of these activities
across regions. Secondly, we have adopted an assumption of negligible entry costs for
manufacturing ﬁrms. The inclusion of product development costs for manufacturing
ﬁrms would, however, allow for a richer characterization of the dynamics of entry and
exit associated with greater economic integration.
29Appendix A: Proof of Proposition 1
The local dynamics around the symmetric steady state are determined by the diﬀer-
ential equation for the productivity gap (19) and the no-arbitrage conditions for the


















Respectively adding and subtracting KlR/θ and K∗l∗
R/θ∗ from (A1) and (A2), these
conditions can be rewritten as follows:









































These conditions can be used to obtain sK and sR. First, in the steady-state equilib-
rium ˙ ω = 0 requires KlR/θ = K∗l∗
R/θ∗ and therefore △1 = △∗
1 = △2 = △∗
2 = 0. Next,
using (16) to substitute lX and l∗
X out of △1 = △∗
1, we ﬁnd that K/θ = K∗/θ∗. This
implies that lR = l∗
R and thus we have lX = l∗
X. Finally, the conditions K/θ = K∗/θ∗
and lX = l∗
X can be solved respectively for (21) and (22).
The no-arbitrage conditions (A3) and (A4) implicitly determine the numbers of
ﬁrms based in each region for a given level of the productivity gap at each moment
in time. Substituting in lR = lX/(σ − 1) − lF and l∗
R = l∗
X/(σ − 1) − lF, from (16),
































































(1 − δ)(lX − lR)
2ND
−
(σ − 2)(1 + δ)(1 + ϕ2)lX








(1 − δ)(lX − lR)
2ND
−
(σ − 2)(1 + δ)ϕ2lX












(σ − 2)(1 + δ)ϕlX































Now, setting (A3) and (A4) equal, solving for KlR/θ−K∗l∗
R/θ∗, and substituting








We approximate the local dynamics around the symmetric dispersed steady state





























Using (16) and (25) with lX =
α(σ−1)2L





(σ − 1)(1 + δ)2ϕ
(1 + ϕ)2 − δ
￿￿
2ρ − (1 + δ)lF
(σ − 2)(1 + δ)
￿
+ δlF. (A8)
31As the productivity gap is a state variable, we require a negative sign for (A8) for a
stable dispersed equilibrium. The sign of (A8) can be described as a function of the
freeness of trade (ϕ) using
ϕ
2 + 2ϕ(1 − κ) + 1 ≥ 0, (A9)
where κ =
(σ−1)(1+δ)(2ρ−(1+δ)lF )
δ(2ρ−(σ−1)(1+δ)lF ) > 0. This quadratic equation can be solved for two
thresholds ˜ ϕ = (κ − 1) ±
p
(κ − 2)κ. However, since κ − 1 > 1 is required for
these thresholds to take real values, only one of them lies between zero and one:
˜ ϕ = (κ−1)−
p
(κ − 2)κ. For ϕ < ˜ ϕ, the dispersed equilibrium is saddle path stable,
and for ϕ > ˜ ϕ it is unstable, as stated in Proposition 1.













(σ − 1)[(σ − 1)(1 + δ2)lF(2ρ − lF) − 2ρ(2ρ − (1 − δ2)lF)]






dδ depends on the sign of the numerator of (B1) which is determined










[(σ − 2)2ρ − (σ − 1)lF]lF
. (B2)
Taking the partial derivative of (B2) with respect to δ and setting the result equal
to zero, we can solve for a threshold value ˜ δ, below which
d˜ ϕ
dδ > 0 and above which
d˜ ϕ
dδ < 0 as stated in Corollary 1.















(σ − 1)(1 − δ)
δ
￿
+ 1 > 0. (C1)
Next, subtracting (A9) from (C1) we obtain
2ϕ(σ − 2)[4δρ + (σ − 1)(1 − δ2)lF]
δ[2ρ − (σ − 1)(1 + δ)lF]
> 0,
for δ,ϕ ∈ (0,1) as we require 2ρ > (σ−1)(1+δ)lF for gD > 0 in the symmetric steady
state. We conclude that the slope of the sK curve is always greater than that of the
sR curve for ϕ < ˜ ϕ in the symmetric dispersed equilibrium. This completes the proof
of Lemma 2.
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